Surveillance methodology brief, May 20, 2026

Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, 2026

Latent Outbreak Visibility System (LOVS) applied to the 2026 BDBV outbreak. Ascertainment, detection depth, and pre-committed methodology calibration points, as of May 20, 2026.

Bottom line. Public reporting likely captures 59-63% of laboratory-confirmable cases. This brief quantifies that visibility gap and pre-commits how the method will be judged.

Spatial evidence mapInspect outbreak zones, corridor edges, calibration links, and source-state evidence on the map.Open map
Why this methodology brief matters
As of May 20, 2026, the most prominent public estimate of the outbreak's scale comes from the joint WHO-Imperial College MRC GIDA report (May 20, 2026), which estimates 400-900 total cases in DRC (values over 1,000 not excluded) using population-movement extrapolation and deaths-back-projection through the case-fatality ratio. This brief is built to sit alongside that work and help the teams responding see one more thing clearly: how much of the outbreak public reporting is likely capturing at this snapshot, how that visibility is shifting, and where cross-border movement would most test the standing assumptions. To keep the contribution accountable, it adds a reporting-completeness estimate, a calibration set committed in advance, and a corridor view with date-stamped resolution, so anyone can check it against what actually happens. It is offered in support of that effort, building on the WHO-Imperial estimate rather than replacing it.

Executive overview, May 20, 2026

What sources available for this snapshot show, and what the method estimates beneath it.

Public reporting picture

Confirmed (laboratory)

53[3]

Range across sources: 1053[3][2][9][10]

Suspected

653[10]

Range across sources: 395653[10][4][8]

Deaths

144[10]

Range across sources: 106144[10][4][8]

Confirmed split: 51 in DRC, 2 in Uganda. Healthcare workers among the deaths: 4.

What the method adds

Visible share

59-63%

Estimated share of laboratory-confirmable cases captured by public reporting.

Detection depth

Multiple rounds

Detection occurred after silent transmission generations, intrinsic to early-stage filovirus surveillance.

Corridors

Calibration only

The watchlist tests uncertainty quality. It is not a ranked deployment list.

Supporting detail

Reporting notes

Uganda count: 2 confirmed in Kampala (1 death) per WHO PHEIC statement, Africa CDC PHECS declaration, and WHO 20 May remarks. WHO reported 51 confirmed cases in DRC across Ituri and North Kivu, including Bunia and Goma. The reported Kinshasa case tested negative on confirmatory INRB testing and is not counted as confirmed. No documented local Uganda transmission as of this as-of date; symptomatic contacts under investigation in Fort Portal following burial attendance in DRC were tracked in the archived 20 May consensus source.[2][8][9][3][10]

Source-conflict notes5
  • Suspected count spans 395 (Africa CDC PHECS, 18 May 2026) to 653 (archived 20 May consensus aggregator citing news and agency sources). ECDC reports over 500 on 19 May; WHO DG remarks on 20 May give the official same-day approximate anchor of almost 600 suspected cases.[8][9][3][10]
  • Deaths span 106 (Africa CDC PHECS, 18 May 2026) to 144 (archived 20 May consensus aggregator). ECDC reports 130 on 19 May; WHO DG remarks on 20 May report 139 suspected deaths.[8][9][3][10]
  • Confirmed count spans 10 (WHO PHEIC statement, 17 May 2026, case data as of 16 May: 8 Ituri + 2 Kampala; Kinshasa case deconfirmed) to 53 (WHO Director-General remarks, 20 May 2026: 51 DRC + 2 Kampala), with ECDC reporting 30 on 19 May and the archived 20 May consensus aggregator reporting 51.[2][9][3][10]
  • Geographic spread beyond the three Ituri Province HZ: confirmed DRC cases in North Kivu including Goma per WHO 20 May remarks; 2 confirmed in Kampala (Uganda, including 1 death); 1 American national evacuated from DRC to Germany and confirmed positive. The reported Kinshasa case was deconfirmed by INRB and is not counted as confirmed. Fort Portal Uganda had symptomatic contacts under investigation but no lab-confirmed local Uganda transmission in the archived 20 May consensus source.[2][3][10]
  • Per-source archive status: all cited sources are registered in data/bundibugyo-2026/manifest.json. WHO DON 602, WHO PHEIC, WHO DG remarks, WHO AFRO landing page, CDC HAN, ECDC, and the consensus aggregator are byte-archived with SHA-256; Africa CDC and Imperial are hash-recorded with restricted raw publisher bytes kept private pending terms or permission confirmation.[1][2][3][4][5][9][10][8][7]
01

Deep analysis

What the public numbers imply

The overview freezes what public reporting can see. This phase explains the hidden-case band, detection depth, and corridor output without turning any of them into a forecast.

Visible vs inferred burden

Trajectory views

Start with the public time series, then compare it with two latent-quantity views: ascertainment-adjusted laboratory-confirmable cases and deaths-back-projected total cases.

Outbreak trajectoryPublic-reporting counts over time, plotted by the source's data/reporting date.At the endpoint, the orange bar above the confirmed line shows the method's inferred-underlying range for laboratory-confirmable cases only (not deaths, not suspected) after correcting for the reporting-completeness posterior.
Trajectory of confirmed, suspected, and deaths over time, with the inferred underlying confirmed-case range at the as-of date.Three trend lines (confirmed, suspected, deaths) plotted from May 15 to May 20. At the as-of date, an orange interval bar sits directly above the confirmed-case endpoint of 53, marking the inferred underlying confirmed-case range of 84 to 90, derived from the reporting-completeness posterior.0100200300400500600700800May 15May 17May 18May 19May 206531444103053No confirmed-case count reported on 2026-05-18.INFERRED UNDERLYINGLAB-CONFIRMABLE CASES849050% interval (LOVS)↑ 37+ unobservedCOUNT

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Suspected (case definition)
Deaths
Confirmed (laboratory, PCR)
Inferred underlying confirmable cases (50% range), confirmed-only
Timeline refs.May 15: [1]May 17: [2]May 18: [8]May 19: [9]May 20: confirmed [3], suspected/deaths [10]

How to read.The three lines are the dated public-reporting anchors carried in this snapshot's source trail [1][2][8][9][3][10]. Official sources are preferred for headline values; the x-axis uses each source's reported data date when available, while later snapshot/capture timing is shown separately in the data-latency table. Where a row mixes publisher cadences, the timeline refs above identify the source used for each metric. Suspected counts use the clinical case definition, deaths are attributed deaths, and confirmed are laboratory-PCR positives. The orange band sits directly above the confirmed-case endpoint and shows the inferred underlying laboratory-confirmable count after correcting only for reporting completeness. The band applies to the confirmed series alone; the method does not model an inferred range on deaths or on suspected counts. The vertical dashed arrow is the ascertainment gap, the implied count of confirmable cases not yet captured in lab data, not a forecast of future spread.

Inferred underlying trajectoryTwo inference bands over the same outbreak timeline. The orange band is the LOVS Module C output: each confirmed-case point divided by the snapshot's reporting-completeness 50% interval (5963%), estimating the true laboratory-confirmable count. The blue-slate band is the deaths back-projection (Imperial Method 2): each reported death count is projected to total cumulative cases as C = D · (1 + r/β)^α / CFR with r = ln(2) / τ₂ at central doubling time τ₂ = 14 d, the BDBV onset-to-death gamma from Rosello et al. 2015 eLife (α = 4.42, β = 0.388/day), and the BDBV case-fatality-ratio 95% CI from US CDC outbreak history (2640%, spanning 55 deaths / 169 cases across the 2007-08 Uganda and 2012 DRC outbreaks). The band's width carries CFR uncertainty only; doubling-time uncertainty is presented separately in the sibling sensitivity grid. When a headline death input has only a publication clock, it is shown as a dashed interval-censored current endpoint rather than a connected dated node. The horizontal markers at 400 and 900 are the joint WHO + Imperial College MRC GIDA, May 20, 2026 total-case estimate (same death-back-projection formula plus a population-movement model), included as an external cross-check. Deaths are the input to the blue-slate back-projection; they are not drawn as a separate band on this chart.
Inferred underlying case trajectory over the snapshot timeline, showing both LOVS confirmable-correction and deaths back-projection bands.Three-series chart over the same outbreak timeline. The lowest line shows publicly-confirmed cases per date. The middle orange band shows the inferred underlying laboratory-confirmable count after correcting for the reporting-completeness 50 percent interval of 59 to 63 percent; at the as-of date this is 84 to 90. The upper blue-slate band shows the inferred total cases from Imperial Method 2 death back-projection at central doubling time 14 days using BDBV case-fatality-ratio priors of 26 to 40 percent; the current snapshot input is 612 to 942 total cases from 144 deaths. Two horizontal reference ticks at 400 and 900 mark the joint WHO and Imperial College MRC GIDA total-case estimate from May 20, 2026.02004006008001,0001,200May 15May 17May 19May 20WHO + Imperial May 20, 400 totalWHO + Imperial May 20, 900 total538490612942CASES (CONFIRMABLE AND TOTAL)

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Confirmed cases (laboratory, PCR), public reporting
Inferred underlying confirmable cases (50% interval, LOVS Module C output)
Inferred total cases (Imperial Method 2 deaths back-projection at central doubling time τ₂ = 14 d, CFR 2640% per US CDC BVD outbreak history, 95% CI of 55/169)
Inferred confirmable-cases midline (mean of orange band)
Inferred total-cases midline (mean of blue-slate band)
Imperial College MRC GIDA, 20 May 2026 (400900total cases, >1,000 not excluded)

How to read the two bands. The orange band comes from LOVS Module C: each publicly-confirmed point divided by the reporting-completeness 50% uncertainty interval. It estimates only the laboratory-confirmable count, because the completeness posterior was fit against confirmed cases. The blue-slate band is a different quantity: total cases (clinically compatible, most never lab-confirmed). It applies Imperial Method 2, C = D · (1 + r/β)^α / CFR, with r = ln(2) / 14d, the Rosello 2015 onset-to- death gamma (α = 4.42, β = 0.388/day), and the BDBV CFR 95% CI from US CDC outbreak history (CFR_LOW = 26%, CFR_HIGH = 40%, 55 deaths / 169 cases across the 2007-08 Uganda and 2012 DRC outbreaks); upper-band uses CFR low, lower-band uses CFR high. The (1 + r/β)^α term is the gamma moment-generating function evaluated at the growth rate; it back-corrects the right-censoring bias from infections that will die but have not yet died at the observation date. Naive D / CFR omits this correction and systematically undershoots in a growing epidemic, which is why the band below is wider and higher than a naive ratio would imply. At the as-of date this yields 612942 total cases from 144 deaths. The dashed horizontal lines at 400 and 900 mark the joint WHO + Imperial College MRC GIDA estimate from May 20, 2026, which uses the same Method 2 formula plus a population-movement model (Uganda export counts vs. observed importations). At the as-of date, the blue-slate band (612 to 942) brackets and extends above the upper end of the Imperial range (400 to 900). The two methods do not have to agree: Imperial integrates an export-flow signal that pulls the central estimate down, while the band here only uses deaths and CFR at the central doubling time. Both methods agree the true total is several multiples of the 53 publicly confirmed cases. The Imperial "values over 1,000 not excluded" tail tracks with the upper edge of the blue-slate band. Honest caveats: (1) the band carries CFR uncertainty only; the doubling-time uncertainty (τ₂ ∈ {7, 14, 21} days per the Imperial sensitivity set) is presented separately in the sibling sensitivity grid so the two assumptions are not blurred into one width; (2) no BDBV-specific published doubling time exists; the 14-day central scenario is anchored to the 2014 West Africa NEJM range (Guinea 15.7 d, Liberia 23.6 d, Sierra Leone 30.2 d) on the fast side, consistent with Imperial's central choice; (3) the as-of completeness posterior is applied across the whole window for the orange band, assuming approximate stability; (4) both bands are latent-quantity uncertainty, not forecasts of growth.

Doubling-time and CFR sensitivity gridDeterministic sensitivity grid for inferred total cases under paired doubling-time and CFR assumptions, using the same analytical form as Imperial Method 2. Computed for the current snapshot's death count with the Rosello 2015 Isiro 2012 onset-to-death gamma (alpha = 4.42, beta = 0.388 per day). Imperial reported the analogous grid for its own report death input; the grid below recalculates it for the current snapshot. This is a sensitivity analysis, not a fitted posterior.
CFR ↓ / Doubling time →7 days14 days21 days
26%1,513942795
33%1,192742626
40%983612516

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How to read the grid. Each cell shows the projected cumulative-case estimate on the same denominator scale as the assumed CFR; it is not a laboratory-confirmed count. The calculation uses 144 deaths at that (CFR, doubling-time) pair and the formula total_cases = deaths × (1 + r/β)^α / CFR with r = ln(2) / doubling_time and the Rosello 2015 onset-to-death gamma (α = 4.42, β = 0.388 per day). Faster doubling (left columns) implies more cases per observed death because each endpoint death reflects a case that occurred ~11.4days ago, when the outbreak was smaller; the column corrects for right-censoring in a growing epidemic. Lower CFR (top rows) implies more total cases per observed death because each death indexes proportionally more survivors. The orange tint is a readability aid: darker cells carry larger inferred totals. The grid's spread is the honest range to hold in mind, not a rank ordering of cells by likelihood.

Outbreak geography18 review-set corridors are overlaid on verified WGS-84 zone markers (data/zones.json); country outlines and lakes are Natural Earth 1:10m public-domain geodata. Confirmed-case and spillover-case zones (the latter, Goma, outside the calibration set) in orange, corridor watch points in blue, the imported-case site (Kampala) in green, border-crossing watch points (Mahagi, Arua) in gray-purple, and source-review geographies in amber. Faint blue lines show review-set corridors at or above 10% adjusted 50% upper bound; the 4 pre-committed calibration corridors are dashed orange. Each carries an orange chip with the upper bound of the ascertainment-adjusted 50% interval for that corridor (e.g. 53% means the model places the upper edge of its 50% uncertainty interval at 53 percentlikelihood the corridor resolves positive at the 30-day horizon).Open spatial map
BDBV 2026 outbreak geography, real coordinates over Natural Earth 1:10m outlines.Equirectangular projection of the eastern DRC and western Uganda border region (28.5°E-33.2°E, 2.6°S-3.4°N). Country outlines and lakes (Albert, Edward, Kivu, Victoria) are Natural Earth 1:10m public-domain geodata. Markers show 19 georeferenced zones at verified WGS-84 coordinates. The map overlays 18 review-set inter-zone watchlist corridors whose adjusted 50% upper bound is at least 10%; 0 lower-signal corridors remain in the audit list. The 4 pre-committed calibration corridors are highlighted in orange. Source-review geographies are shown only when carried by the active snapshot and are not model inputs. Calibration corridors carry inline upper-bound chips.29°E30°E31°E32°E33°E2°S1°S0°N1°N2°N3°NLake AlbertLake EdwardLake KivuDRCUGANDAIturi ProvinceNorth Kivu ProvinceSouth Kivu ProvinceWestern RegionRwampara Health Zone to Bundibugyo District: 50% upper 52.9%53%Bunia to Kampala: 50% upper 52.8%53%Rwampara Health Zone to Kasese District: 50% upper 52.1%52%Mongbwalu to Beni: 50% upper 51.8%52%Mongbwalu: 1.935°N, 30.046°EMongbwaluBunia: 1.562°N, 30.260°EBuniaRwampara Health Zone: 1.578°N, 30.140°ERwampara Health ZoneBambu Health Zone: 1.874°N, 30.220°EBambu Health ZoneNizi Health Zone: 1.780°N, 30.324°ENizi Health ZoneKilo Health Zone: 1.762°N, 30.085°EKilo Health ZoneMahagi: 2.313°N, 30.984°EMahagiArua: 3.020°N, 30.911°EAruaNebbi: 2.479°N, 31.090°ENebbiBeni: 0.491°N, 29.472°EBeniButembo: 0.142°N, 29.291°EButemboKatwa: 0.100°S, 29.317°EKatwaNyankunde: 1.432°N, 30.033°ENyankundeBundibugyo District: 0.710°N, 30.062°EBundibugyo DistrictKasese District: 0.183°N, 30.083°EKasese DistrictKampala: 0.316°N, 32.582°EKampalaKinshasa: 4.322°S, 15.312°EKinshasaGoma: 1.679°S, 29.223°EGomaMiti-Murhesa Health Zone: 2.240°S, 28.812°EMiti-Murhesa Health ZoneConfirmed-case site (Ituri HZ)Corridor target / watch siteImported case (Kampala, 2 confirmed)Border-crossing watch (Mahagi, Arua), not in calibration setSpillover case (Goma), not in calibration setLocal reporting review site, not a model inputCalibration corridor (n=4), chip = 50% upperOther review-set corridors (n=14)

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How to read. Country outlines and lakes are Natural Earth 1:10m public-domain geodata, Douglas-Peucker simplified for inline display (border tolerance 0.025°, lake tolerance 0.01°). Zone markers are placed at verified WGS-84 decimal-degree coordinates from data/zones.json in the source repository; visible labels show names only to keep the dense border cluster readable. The map foregrounds 18 corridors whose adjusted 50% upper bound reaches at least 10%; 0 lower-signal corridors remain in the audit list rather than the map. The 4 pre-committed calibration corridors are highlighted with their ascertainment-adjusted 50% upper bounds. The corridor lines are watch points, not predictions of where the outbreak will spread, and not recommendations to restrict movement between these zones.

Model-abstracted zones not plotted (2)
  • ituri: Province-level label, not a specific point. The three affected health zones (Mongbwalu, Rwampara, Bunia) sit inside this province. The corridor model treats 'ituri' as a candidate source label; this is a known model artifact (province-level rollup) rather than a verified third source zone.
  • bundibugyo: The pipeline emits 'bundibugyo' as both a DRC source zone and a Uganda target ('bundibugyo-uga'). The target form is a real Ugandan district (Bundibugyo District). The source form has NO verified DRC referent: BDBV is the virus name, and Bundibugyo District is in Uganda not DRC. This is a model-attribution error that we surface honestly rather than hide. Excluded from the projected map.

Analysis step 1

Ascertainment gap is wide and quantifiable

The first question is not whether the public count is wrong; it is how much of the underlying outbreak the public count can plausibly see.

Reporting completeness

59.2% to 62.8%

50% uncertainty range for the share of underlying laboratory-confirmable cases reflected in public counts.

Drivers

Delay + context

Reporting delay, historical late Bundibugyo detection, insecurity, displacement, malaria, and other febrile, gastrointestinal, arboviral, or influenza-like illnesses all widen the visible-to-underlying gap.

Interpretation

Structural

The gap is an early-outbreak reporting feature, not a critique of the national response.

The delay prior is anchored to Camacho 2015 PLOS Currents [Camacho 2015] as an Ebola-Zaire onset-to-notification proxy. Bundibugyo detection history is anchored to Wamala 2010 Emerging Infectious Diseases [Wamala 2010]; the Ituri operating context is described with ACLED conflict context [ACLED] and concurrent diagnostic confounders.

Reporting completeness, 50% interval
Reporting completeness 50% interval: 59.2% to 62.8%.0%25%50%75%100%59.2%62.8%

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Analysis step 2

Detection occurred after multiple silent transmission rounds

The second question is timing: how much person-to-person spread likely occurred before the outbreak was visible in public reporting.

At least 3 generations

essentially 100%

Posterior mass that three or more person-to-person transmission rounds preceded public visibility.

Censored upper bin

93%

Mass at at least 6 generations, the simulator's capped upper bin.

Chart drivers

Count + priors

This posterior uses the confirmed-case count, an interim R prior, and an under-ascertainment prior. Wamala 2010 [Wamala 2010] and MacNeil 2010 [MacNeil 2010] inform timing context, not the numeric bins.
Posterior over transmission generations before detectionP(≥ 3 silent generations) = 100%. Most of that mass sits at the censored upper bin (≥ 6 generations): 93%. The branching-process simulator caps at 6 generations by construction, so the upper bin should be read as a lower bound on detection depth, not a precise count.
Posterior probability over number of transmission generations before detection, bins 1 through 6.0%25%50%75%100%1gen2gen3gen2.0%4gen5.3%5gen93%≥ 66+ gensPOSTERIOR PROBABILITYGENERATIONS BEFORE DETECTION

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Point bin (exactly N generations)
Censored upper bin (N or more generations)

Analysis step 3

Corridor watch list is descriptive, not a ranking

The corridor output is useful because it is pre-committed and inspectable. It is not yet useful as a ranked deployment list.

Corridors tested

18

Inter-zone corridors at a 30-day horizon.

Upper-bound cluster

49.5%-53.3%

Ascertainment-adjusted 50% uncertainty upper bounds cluster tightly; lower bounds span 20.9%-24.7%.

Reader takeaway

No ranking yet

The clustering is the signal: the method does not yet discriminate corridors above chance.
Corridor watchlist18 review-set corridors at a 30-day horizon, with an ascertainment-adjusted 50% upper bound of at least 10%. 0 lower-signal corridors are collapsed below so the first read stays focused on epidemiologically interpretable signal.
Corridor watchlist with ascertainment-adjusted 50% intervals.Horizontal interval bars for 18 corridors. Each bar shows the method's 50% uncertainty range for the binary outcome of at least one new laboratory-confirmed case appearing in the target zone within the horizon, given continued reporting in the source zone.SOURCE → TARGETASCERTAINMENT-ADJUSTED 50% INTERVALUPPER0%25%50%75%100%buniaarua-uga53.3%rwamparabundibugyo-uga52.9%rwamparabeni-cod52.9%mongbwalunebbi-uga52.8%buniakampala-uga52.8%mongbwalukasese-uga52.7%mongbwaluarua-uga52.1%rwamparakasese-uga52.1%rwamparaarua-uga52.0%mongbwalubeni-cod51.8%buniabundibugyo-uga51.6%mongbwalubundibugyo-uga51.4%buniakasese-uga51.2%rwamparanebbi-uga51.1%bunianebbi-uga51.1%rwamparakampala-uga51.1%mongbwalukampala-uga50.8%buniabeni-cod49.5%Range across all 18 upper bounds: 49.5% to 53.3% (lower bounds: 20.9% to 24.7%)

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Pre-committed calibration corridor
Descriptive watch point

How to read. Each bar is the method's 50% uncertainty range for the binary outcome "at least one new laboratory-confirmed case appears in the target zone within 30 days, given continued reporting in the source zone." The tight clustering of upper bounds across the review set is the headline signal: the method has enough structure to identify a surveillance review set, but not enough to rank corridors as deployment priorities. Corridors below 10% are retained for auditability rather than foregrounded.

Corridor watchlist (map view)This map foregrounds 18 georeferenced review-set corridors with an ascertainment-adjusted 50% upper bound of at least 10%: 4 pre-committed calibration corridors in dashed orange, plus 14 descriptive watchlist corridors in blue. The 0 lower-signal mapped corridors stay in the interval chart audit list rather than cluttering the default geography view. The orange chip value (e.g. 52%) comes from the formal calibration registry and reads as "the model places the upper edge of its 50% interval at 52 percentlikelihood the corridor resolves positive at the 30-day horizon." The descriptive corridors are intentionally not given inline percentage chips; their numeric ordering lives in the bar chart above.Open spatial map
Georeferenced corridor watchlist drawn over Natural Earth outlines.Equirectangular projection of the eastern DRC and western Uganda border region. The map draws 18 review-set corridors with verified coordinates as source-to-target centroid lines: 4 pre-committed calibration corridors and 14 descriptive watchlist corridors. Line weight scales with the watchlist-row ascertainment-adjusted 50% upper bound, range 49.5% to 53.3%. 0 mapped lower-signal corridors below 10% are omitted from this default map view and retained in the interval chart audit list. Calibration corridors carry inline percentage chips. 0 corridors are omitted because at least one endpoint lacks verified coordinates.29°E30°E31°E32°E33°E2°S1°S0°N1°N2°N3°NLake AlbertLake EdwardLake KivuDRCUGANDARwampara Health Zone to Bundibugyo District: registry 50% upper 52.3%52%Bunia to Kampala: registry 50% upper 52.3%52%Rwampara Health Zone to Kasese District: registry 50% upper 51.5%52%Mongbwalu to Beni: registry 50% upper 52.2%52%MongbwaluBuniaRwampara HZAruaNebbiBeniBundibugyo DistrictKasese DistrictKampalaCalibration corridors (4/4), chip = registry 50% upperOther review-set corridors (14)Source zone (Ituri HZ)Corridor target (DRC + Uganda)Line weight ∝ ascertainment-adjusted 50% upper bound

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How to read. Each line is one review-set corridor from the watchlist bar chart, drawn from source-zone centroid (orange dot) to target-zone centroid (blue dot) at WGS-84 decimal-degree coordinates from data/zones.json. Wider lines indicate higher watchlist-row upper bounds. The 4 mapped pre-committed calibration corridors are dashed orange with their registry upper bound in a chip; the other mapped corridors are descriptive blue. Background corridors below 10% stay in the interval chart audit list. All review-set corridors in the bar chart are georeferenced and shown here. The cluster of mapped upper bounds within the 50%53% band shows what the bar chart says numerically: the method does not yet discriminate corridors above chance.

On Goma. Goma is a major commercial hub in North Kivu, roughly 700 km south of the outbreak core in Bunia. It already shows one laboratory-confirmed BDBV case, a traveler infected in Ituri, so it is rendered as a spillover-case site on the Outbreak geography map above. The most parsimonious epidemiological reading of that case is one of two: the virus traveled directly from the outbreak core via Goma's commercial air or lake links, or community transmission has gone undetected along the Bunia, Beni, Bundibugyo, Kasese corridor. Either reading raises surveillance priority for those intermediate zones. Goma is not in this snapshot's pre-committed corridor calibration set, because each snapshot freezes its calibration zones at build time and the 20 May snapshot was pinned without a Goma corridor. Goma should only join a later snapshot as a candidate calibration zone if that snapshot pins its own scoring contract before outcome assessment.

02

Calibration thread

How the method will be judged

The next pieces separate live outbreak interpretation from method evaluation: pre-committed June resolution blocks, then a retrospective backtest that says what the method is already good and bad at.

Forward scorecard

Calibration blocks carried by the May 20, 2026 snapshot

This snapshot carries 1 active calibration block. Each block has its own pin date, horizon, and resolution clock.

Snapshot as-of

May 20, 2026

This page is a new snapshot; carried blocks are not re-pinned.

Active blocks

1 block

4 points; 0 blocks pinned in this snapshot.

Next scoring clock

June 19, 2026

The nearest scoring window ends at the published resolution timestamp.
Pre-commitment timeline
Three-event timeline from outbreak declaration to calibration resolution.May 15, 2026Outbreak declaredDRC MoPHHSW / WHO DON 602May 20, 2026Calibration block pre-committed4 corridors pinned May 20, 2026Jun 19, 2026Resolution windowScored against public sources

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PointCorridorBlock / designRegistry intervalStatement
Point 1Bunia -> Kampalablock[22.9% to 52.3%]30d from 2026-05-20
Details

Calibration point for corridor bunia -> kampala-uga.

Point 2Rwampara -> Bundibugyoblock[22.7% to 52.3%]30d from 2026-05-20
Details

Calibration point for corridor rwampara -> bundibugyo-uga.

Point 3Mongbwalu -> Beniblock[21.8% to 52.2%]30d from 2026-05-20
Details

At least one new laboratory-confirmed BDBV case appears in Beni Health Zone (North Kivu Province, DRC) between 20 May 2026 and 19 June 2026, given continued reporting from Mongbwalu Health Zone (Ituri Province, DRC).

Point 4Rwampara -> Kaseseblock[20.9% to 51.5%]30d from 2026-05-20
Details

At least one new laboratory-confirmed BDBV case appears in Kasese District (Uganda) between 20 May 2026 and 19 June 2026, given continued reporting from Rwampara Health Zone (Ituri Province, DRC).

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Retrospective scorecard

Historical calibration on the 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic

The method has been tested against a known historical outbreak before being used as a live calibration artifact here.

Uncertainty quality

35% tighter

Country-level context improves interval score from 0.1002 to 0.0649.

Discrimination

Still chance-level

Local context does not yet separate individual corridors above chance in this backtest.

Transfer caveat

Zaire -> BDBV

The 2014 substrate is a Zaire-species outbreak; species-transfer uncertainty remains unquantified here.

The retrospective substrate is Backer and Wallinga 2016 [Backer 2016]: 62 prefectures across 74 weeks. The five evaluation checkpoints are historical West Africa backtest weeks W3, W5, W7, W9, and W11, not the live BDBV case count. The current-outbreak sections use the snapshot's reconciled confirmed count separately from this historical backtest. Three runs are reported below: without local context, with country-level local context, and with district-level local context.

MetricNo local contextCountry-levelDistrict-level
Brier score, probability accuracy, lower is better0.05860.05900.0590
Interval score, Bracher 2021, uncertainty quality, lower is better0.10020.06490.0649
Calibration error, predicted vs observed frequency, lower is better0.03910.05000.0500

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03

Use with care

What should change the weight you give the outputs

These sections make the blindspots visible before asking for better field inputs. The intent is not to hide uncertainty, but to show exactly which data would most improve the method.

Known caveats

Known blindspots and calibration-design notes

These are the caveats that should change how much weight a reader gives each output. The highest-impact gap is separated from secondary caveats so the audit story is easier to scan.

Calibration design

Narrow band

The May 21 block improves relative coverage across high/mid/low ranks and control roles, but the aggregate-input model still does not produce a clean 5-20% absolute low-risk band.

Attribution

Beni confounding

North Kivu is already part of the reported outbreak footprint. A positive mongbwalu -> beni-cod resolution may reflect Beni already being active, not a clean source-to-target transmission event.

Context input

Qualitative conflict

CODECO and ADF activity plus eastern DRC displacement are used as descriptive context, but the per-zone conflict input still comes from the 2014 West Africa ACLED backtest. A 2026 eastern DRC ACLED snapshot is a documented next lever.

Reporting-delay prior

Single prior outbreak

The May 23 parameter audit adopts the Rosello 2015 BDBV Isiro 2012 onset-to-notification distribution as the species-matched reporting-delay default, but it is a small single prior outbreak (n=52) and is graded as historical, not a fitted 2026 estimate. Camacho 2015 EBOV-Zaire is retained as a faster-reporting sensitivity comparator.

These blindspots are surfaced so a responder can adjust how much weight to give each output. They are tracked in the source repository's commit history; updates will land in subsequent snapshots.

Contribution path

If you have point-of-care data

Publicly aggregated reporting can only take the method so far. The inputs below are the highest-leverage ways to sharpen it without moving sensitive data into public view.

This brief reports method estimates from publicly aggregated reporting only. Responders in the affected zones may hold data that can sharpen the method, but those data are likely privileged, time-sensitive, and not appropriate for a public repository.

  • Onset-date extract

    A partial onset-date histogram for one health zone narrows the latent-active-chains plausibility interval. A two-column CSV with anonymous row ID and onset date is enough.

  • Zone-attributed counts

    A {health-zone-id: confirmed_count} mapping for affected districts is the largest single discrimination lever the method is missing.

  • Validated centroids

    For zones the snapshot may have missed, a GPS centroid plus one-sentence rationale is enough to extend the corridor model and geography visual.

  • Mobility or transport flow

    Admin-2 call-detail-record summaries or surveyed transport flows are the documented next lever for corridor-spread discrimination.

  • Confirmation latency

    Observed sample-to-PCR-result delays, in days, directly update the reporting-completeness prior.

Public issues are welcome for methodology. For sensitive data, coordinate a secure handoff first; contributions that land in the repository are cited and timestamped.

Email Frans
04

Audit trail

Limits, external cross-checks, and source trail

The final phase collects the hard boundaries of the brief, how LOVS uses the Imperial estimate, and the references needed to inspect the evidence chain.

Boundaries

What this brief does NOT claim

These limits are part of the product surface. They keep the page from being misread as operational guidance or a forecast.

  • Not a forecast

    The pre-committed calibration points exist to evaluate the method's uncertainty quality at resolution. They are not surveillance recommendations and not deployment recommendations.
  • Not a critique of the national response

    Ascertainment gaps and late detection of filoviruses are intrinsic to the pathogen and to the operational context (security, displacement, co-circulating pathogens), not to the speed of any specific national response. The DRC Ministry of Public Health declared on 15 May, the Uganda Ministry of Health confirmed imported cases on 15-16 May, and INRB confirmed BDBV by PCR within days. This brief takes the national declarations as the authoritative timeline.
  • Does not replace field epidemiology

    Line-listing, contact tracing, genomic sequencing, and clinical reasoning are where outbreak control happens.
  • Species-transfer uncertainty is not separately quantified

    The historical calibration substrate is a Zaire-species outbreak; transfer to Bundibugyo carries unquantified uncertainty in the priors and the corridor model.
  • Numbers are prior-dominated at this case count

    The ascertainment and transmission-depth posteriors are heavily informed by the prior delay and transmission distributions, not by data alone. In particular, the branching-process reproduction prior is an interim modeling assumption: the May 23 parameter audit found historical BDBV model-derived R0 candidates, but not a measured 2026 R0. The detection-depth result is therefore prior-driven and not a data-driven current-outbreak BDBV estimate. Sensitivity analyses across alternative priors remain a recommended next step.
  • Open to independent replication

    Code is Apache 2.0 licensed; original authored methodology, prose, schema, and derived artifacts are CC BY 4.0; third-party source material and extracted publisher-owned tables retain their original terms. The method is described in CITATIONS.md. Independent replication is welcomed.

External cross-check

How LOVS treats the Imperial estimate

On May 20, 2026, Imperial College MRC GIDA and WHO published a joint situation estimate using two independent methods. LOVS uses that report as a methodological cross-check, not as a value to copy.

Adopted public inputs

CFR scenarios of 26%, 33%, 40% from the US CDC BDBV history; the Rosello onset-to-death fit; and the Method 2 deaths-back-projection formula as a cross-check.

Held separate

Imperial's final 400 to 900 total-case range and restricted Table 3 point-of-entry counts are not adopted into public LOVS outputs. The total-case range appears on the trajectory chart only as dashed reference ticks, so the LOVS band remains independent.

LOVS adds

Pre-committed corridor calibration, retrospective West Africa scoring, per-corridor reporting-completeness intervals, open-source code, and resolution scoring with the Weighted Interval Score.
Why the blue-slate band uses Imperial Method 2
The trajectory chart uses C = D · (1 + r/β)^α / CFR, not naive D / CFR. The correction follows Nishiura's real-time CFR formulation: in a growing epidemic, some infections that will die have not died yet, so a simple deaths/CFR ratio systematically undershoots. Joint Bayesian alternatives such as Salje, Cauchemez et al. 2020 require line-list or hospital-admission time series that this public snapshot does not have.
How doubling-time uncertainty is handled
No published BDBV-specific doubling time exists. Rosello et al. report effective reproduction numbers for Isiro 2012, but not a doubling time; the nearest filovirus growth anchors are the WHO Ebola Response Team 2014 estimates for Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. LOVS follows Imperial's central τ₂ = 14 d scenario and shows τ₂ ∈ {7, 14, 21} d in the sensitivity grid instead of mixing CFR and growth-rate uncertainty into one band.

Both efforts agree that the true outbreak is several multiples of public confirmations. The independent LOVS contribution is the pre-committed corridor view and its future scoring surface. Original authored methodology, prose, schema, and derived artifacts are released through the source repository; third-party source material retains publisher terms. Retrospective context comes from the West Africa 2014 outbreak.

Source trail

References

Consolidated bibliography across the brief, the LOVS pipeline priors, and the joint WHO-Imperial College MRC GIDA May 20, 2026 report referenced as an external cross-check. The full version with method-by-method attribution is in CITATIONS.md.

Frozen outbreak sources

10

Pulled from the snapshot JSON so the source trail moves with the dated page.

Methodology priors

14

Literature used by LOVS or by the Imperial cross-check.

Candidate inputs

1

Useful next-lever source classes that are not yet integrated into the pipeline.

Downloadable appendix

XLSX

Public-health evidence workbook generated from the pinned snapshot, source manifest, evidence-chain registry, and calibration ledger. Download workbook. Schema.

The outbreak-source list below is the frozen public-source set for this snapshot. Archive status is shown inline where available.

Primary outbreak and reporting sources

Methodology priors used by LOVS or Imperial

  • [M1]Imai et al. 2020, Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team Report 1, geographic-spread extrapolation blueprint cited by the Imperial-WHO outbreak-size estimate.
  • [M2]Rosello et al. 2015 eLife, Ebola virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1976-2014. The Isiro 2012 BDBV fit is the source of the onset-to-death gamma used in the deaths-back-projection arm and, after the May 23 parameter audit, of the onset-to-notification distribution adopted as the reporting-delay default for the Module C visibility nowcast (Camacho 2015 retained as the faster-reporting sensitivity comparator).
  • [M3]Wamala et al. 2010 EID, the Bundibugyo 2007-2008 Uganda discovery outbreak; source of the BDBV case-fatality-ratio range and the inter-case interval prior.
  • [M4]MacNeil et al. 2010 EID, BVD clinical features in Uganda; source of the mean incubation period and the bleeding-prevalence prior.
  • [M5]Albarino et al. 2013 Virology, BDBV genomic analysis across Uganda and DRC outbreaks; consistency check for species-stable transmission dynamics.
  • [M6]Faye et al. 2015 Lancet Infectious Diseases, Zaire-species serial-interval estimate referenced in the broader LOVS methodology lineage.
  • [M7]Camacho et al. 2015 PLOS Currents Outbreaks, EBOV-Zaire onset-to-notification delay retained as the reporting-delay sensitivity comparator after the May 23 parameter audit.
  • [M8]Choi et al. 2019 BIOMATH, historical Isiro 2012 BDBV modeling source surfaced by WHO grEPI for model-derived reproduction-number candidates; used only to cap and ground the R prior, not as a measured current-outbreak R0.
  • [M9]Cori et al. 2013 American Journal of Epidemiology, the EpiEstim R_t estimation framework from the broader Ebola modeling lineage; not a source for any LOVS delay or transmission prior.
  • [M10]Van Kerkhove et al. 2015 Scientific Data, Ebola epidemiological-parameter review; documents the earlier BDBV R0 evidence gap that the May 23 grEPI/Choi audit updates with capped, model-derived historical evidence.
  • [M11]WHO grEPI, Global Repository of Epidemiological Parameters; used on May 23 as the external source feed for population-level BDBV parameter candidates, with organism-level quantities excluded.
  • [M12]Backer and Wallinga 2016 PLOS Computational Biology, the 2014 West Africa Ebola spatiotemporal panel used as the LOVS Mode A retrospective substrate.
  • [M13]Bracher et al. 2021 PLOS Computational Biology, the Weighted Interval Score used in the LOVS calibration scoring.
  • [M14]ACLED conflict-event data, political-violence context used in the historical calibration substrate and referenced as qualitative Ituri/eastern DRC operating-context evidence.

Candidate inputs not yet integrated